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1977 AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD LEGISLATION: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 
Harold D. Guither, University of Illinois 
B.F. Stanton, Cornell University 
THE SETTING 
The new Administration and Congress that arrive in 
Washington in January 1977 must decide whether to ex-
tend or modify the Agriculture and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1973, which expires at the end of 1977. 
Any new ·legislation must conform to the budget 
process adopted by Congress in 1974. This requires a set 
of cost estimates for provisions of such legislation by 
March 15, 1977. Agreement on a new or modified bill 
must come from the Senate and House Agriculture Com-
mittees by May 15. Congress has until the second week 
of September to take final action. The new budget proc-
ess also gives more emphasis on program costs and could 
influence final legislative decisions. 
With this timetable and a new Administration, Con-
gress could simply extend the Act for another year with 
some modifications. Such action would allow time for 
debate and discussion on the issues before writing a new 
Act. The Secretary could establish closer relationships 
with the Senate and House Committees and the many 
groups interested in legislation. Specific provisions such 
as target prices, loan rates or set aside could be consid-
ered separately but within the framework of the present 
act. 
Interest and concern for food and agricultural legis-
lation now comes from many diverse groups. The House 
and Senate Agriculture Committees and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture listen to many conflicting voices as 
proposals an.d new bills are .drafted. Spokesmen for con-
sumer groups and organized labor present their views 
along with farm organizations and agriculturally-related 
businesses. 
THE 1973 ACT: EXTENSION OR MODIFICATION 
New legislation usually builds on past experience. The 
1973 Act modified older legislation which still remains 
in force. This will be the base from which discussion 
starts in 1977. The concept of target prices and defi-
ciency payments was the major change from past legis-
lation in 1973. Such issues as feed and food grain re-
serves and conditions for their release or sale, basic sup-
port levels and loan rates may gi\'e rise to new provisions. 
Major Provisions of the 1973 Act 
Target prices were established for wheat, feed grains 
and cotton in the 19 7 3 Act and for rice in 19 7 5. Be-
cause market prices have stayed above target prices un-
til 1976 no deficiency payments were made during most 
of this legislative mandate. Loan rates were set at lower 
lev.els in relation to market prices than in previous Iegis-
lat10n. The Secretary was given substantial discretionary 
authority. Natural disaster payments were provided for 
those prevented from planting or from harvesting if pro-
duction falls below two-thirds of a normal crop of 
wheat, feed grains or cotton. A payment limitation of 
$20,000 per person for all commodity programs was set. 
A set aside program was authorized for use at the dis-
cretion of the Secretary. 
Many other items were included in the 1973 Act. 
The Public Law 480 and Food Stamp programs were ex-
tended for four years; dairy price supports, Class I base 
plans for milk, and incentive payments for wool were 
continued. A disaster reserve of wheat, feed grains and 
soybeans was implemented. Annual cost of production 
studies for wheat, feed grains, cotton, and dairy product 
were required. Most titles continued existing programs 
with modest changes. 
Other Agricultural Programs 
While the 1973 Act considered many basic commodi-
ties and programs, it did not cover everything. Other 
programs covered in separate legislation could come up 
for consideration. Peanuts, tobacco, and extra long sta-
ple cotton, with their separate production control pro-
grams are important to certain producers. Sugar, long 
the subject of special legislation, may return to the 
agenda. Export and import controls and authority to re-
spond to changing conditions are important issues. 
KEY ISSUES 
In the first months of 1977 key working relationships 
will need to be established and agreement sought be-
tween the House and Senate agricultural leadership and 
the new Administration. An agenda would need to be 
reached quickly if a substantial new Act is to emerg~. 
A-1 
/\>i cxk-1,ion <·f ;he l~ '3 Act with some rr.-idificatio ... 
»>'C''llci be easier to ac! ;eve. Then the important issues 
r:ould be clarified befwe new legislation is enacted. One 
set of issues will relat•· to the philosophy behind the Act 
and the role of the federal government. The other will 
deal with specific programs such as target price>, com-
modity reserves, loan rates, resale prices and the ways in 
which transfer payments may be made to farmers. 
Philosophy 
Every administration seeks to set its own imprint on 
policy and programs. In the 1973 Act, the Secretary of 
Agriculture sought and received substantial authority 
for discretionary action in response to changing market 
and political forces. A 1y piece of legislation defines or 
establishes the ways in which government relates to the 
activities of individuals and private business. Legislation 
is a response to the requests of producers and consumers 
after public debate. The question is not simply one of 
little or no government versus much more government. 
It is one of degree and style. There will be some form of 
government intervention in many aspects of food and 
agricultural policy. Debate centers on the conditions un-
der which government intervention or action occurs, 
where the leadership rests, how much discretion rests 
with federal officials, and who takes initiative. 
The role of government in agriculture and how this 
role is viewed by farmers, consumers and the general 
public will be of concern to Congress and the new Secre-
tary. Present legislation and the ways in which it can be 
used to respond to changing supply-demand conditions 
will be assessed. The trade-offs between stability of farm 
and retail prices of food, costs of differeri't programs, the 
need for reserves, the management of potential surpluses 
and shortages must also be considered. A philosophy 
toward federal programs in agriculture will evolve from 
the Carter administration. 
Specific I~ues 
1. Target Prices, Loan Rates, and Deficiency Pay-
ments. The level and method of adjusting target prices 
is a concem to many producers. The relative emphasis 
on target prices and loan rates has important effects on 
producer incomes, price stability, government acquisi-
tion of reserves or amounts of deficiency payments. Re-
lationships of target prices and loan rates among com-
modities will affect producer decisions. 
2. Acreage Allotments have been used as a means of 
controlling output and in calculating deficiency and dis-
aster payments. The means of establishing allotments on 
individual farms affects farmers production decisions 
and the size of deficiency or disaster payments. 
3. Production controls mav involve direct control of 
output or indirect control thr;;,ugh the use of inputs like 
land or fertilizer. They may be \'oluntary or compulsory. 
Production control may involve all crops or specific 
crops or be tied to conservation. 
4. Special Commodity Programs have been estab-
lished for dairy products, peanuts, tobacco, extra long 
stJpk cutton, wool and mohai ·11d ,Llg~u. The~t. i11-
volvc individual methods of pro.iding price supports, 
payments, or production quotas. The issue is whether 
these special programs should be phased into the sys-
tem of target prices, lower loan rates, deficiency pay-
ments, and less restrictive production established for 




5. Crop Insurance has been offered to farmers since · 
1934 and Disaster Payments were provided in the 1973 
Act to reduce risks and aid farmers if crop yields drop- · 
ped substantially. The two programs raise the question 
of how mr.ch and what types of risk protection the 
government should provide. 
6. Export and Import Controls affect the conditions 
under which foreign producers and consumers are to 
have access to U.S. markets. Reducing or eliminating 
such controls promotes more international trade and 
economic benefits to both producers and consumers, al-
though high cost producers may suffer a loss of markets. 
7. Commodity Reserves have become a significant 
issue since 1972 because the U.S. government no longer 
holds large stocks and prices have fluctuated widely. Im-
portant questions concern the role of government in ac- 1 
quiring and releasing stocks. t 
8. Food Aid has been provided to low income people 
in this country through food stamps and overseas 
through Public Law 480. Originally these programs as-
sisted in disposing of surplus commodities and supported 
U.S. farm prices and incomes. The questions are how 
much aid should be given, who should receive it, wheth-
er it should be given as food or cash payments in a gen-
eral income maintenance program, and who should ad-
minister it. 
REVERTING TO EARLIER BASIC LEGISLATION 
If Congress does not extend the 1973 Act or enact 
new legislation, some present provisions and programs 
will expire. Others will continue in a changed form un-
der authority of so-called permanent or basic legislation. 
The following program authority would revert to ex-
isting permanent legislation if no new legislation were 
enacted in 1977: wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice, 
wool and mohair, milk price support, cottonseed-soy-
bean support price relationship, and CCC minimum sales 
prices. 
The following program authority would expire: Pub-
lic Law 480, dairy products, indemnity payments pro-
gram, Class I base plan, CCC donations to the military 
and VA hospitals, beekeepers indemnity program, and 
the cropland conversion program. 
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1977 Agricultural and Food Issues -
TARGET PRICES, LOAN RATES, AND DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS 
W. Fred Woods, Extension Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture 
J.B. Penn, Economic Research Service, U.S. D<"'partment of Agriculture 
Dennis Henderson, Ohio State University 
WHAT IS THE ISSUE? 
A major instrument of U.S. agricultural price and in-
come policy has been price support through the Com-
modity Oedit Corporation (CCC) non-recourse loan 
program. The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act 
of 1973 introduced an additional policy instrument for 
income support, the target price concept. Designed to 
vary support inversely with market price, it was initially 
extended to feed grains, wheat, and upland cotton. Rice 
was added in 1976 under separate legislation. Deficiency 
payments are made to producers only if the market 
price falls below target price levels. 
The target price/loan rate instruments are expected 
to be an integral part of replacement legislation for the 
1973 Act. In fact, primary issues in the 1977 debate are 
expected to center around these concepts. The central 
issue of the debate will be the support levels, on what 
basis these should be set, and how they are to be ad-
justed over time. A secondary issue could be whether to 
retain the target price concept, depending upon levels 
adopted for the loan rates. 
WHY IS IT AN ISSUE? 
The target price concept provides a system of support 
payments to producers which vary inversely with market 
prices. Deficiency payments are viewed as income sup-
plements to producers, moderating the adverse effects 
of short-term price fluctuations. While farmers may pro-
duce any number of acres of the program crops (or 
designated substitute crops), deficiency payments apply 
only to production from allotted acreages. This feature 
is in contrast to price support loans for which all of a 
farmer's production is eligible (except rice, for which 
loans are limited to "normal" production). 
While the target price concept was unique in the I ~17 '.) 
legislation, it has not been fully tried and its usefulness 
ma\· be debated, depending upon the level of loan rates. 
If loan rates are raised to relatively high le\·els in new 
legislation, target prices could well be phased out. On 
the one hand is the view that they are not needed with 
high loan rates. On the other, if loan rates are low and 
target prices high, the potential for large deficiency pay-
ments is increased and the public might be unwilling to 
finance large treasury outlays with surplus production. 
Provisions of the 1973 Act regarding target prices and 
loan rates were designed to promote a greater reliance 
upon the market. As this was achieved, certain concerns 
and greater producer and consumer uncertainty arose 
due to (1) increased lack of knowledge about future 
conditions resulting from the absence of government 
programs with known provisions (in the 1960's, for in-
stance, producers knew that price would approximate 
the loan rate due to the presence of large stocks); (2) un-
bounded competition between domestic and foreign 
consumers (resulting in arbitrary export control and pur-
chase agreements for selected countries); ( 3) consider-
ably more farm product and food price instability than 
had existed in several decades, with largely unknown 
and subtle effects and ( 4) potentially unbounded in-
creases in farm production costs due to such uncontrol-
lable influences as the international energy situation and 
widespread inflation with no comparable changes in 
minimum prices for farm products. 
THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Under the 19 7 3 Agriculture and Consumer Protection 
Act, target prices for 1974 and 1975 crops were set at 
38 cents per pound for upland cotton, $2.05 per bushel 
for wheat and $1.38 per bushel for corn with reasonable 
rates to be set for other feed grains in relation to the 
rate for corn. Adjustments in target prices for 1976 and 
19 77 as provided in the 19 7 3 legislation are based on 
changes in USDA 's Index of Prices Paid for Production 
Items, Interest, Taxes and Wage Rates (PPI) and changes 
in the 3-year moving a\·erage of individual crop yields. 
Following this adjustment procedure 1976 target pri~es 
were 43.2 cents a pound for cotton, $2.29 for whe<..t 
and SI.57 fur corn. 
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Whil1 ltpward adjustn ·•lLS e<tus-:o by 111d1 .tses in ti. 
PPl ca:1 bt part1;1lly or t· ·tally offset by increases in aver-
age yidds, the kgislafrin is interpreted to prevent re-
ductions in target prices due to increases in yields. How-
ever, target prices m:1y fall below the previous year's 
level due to declines in the PPL 
Loan rate adjustments are not covered by formula 
under the current legislation. Generally, upper a,1d lower 
bounds are prescribed for specific crops and the Secre-
tary of Agriculture is allowed discretion in setting loan 
rates within those bounds. Once loan rate levels are an-
nounced they cannot be reduced for that crop year. 
They may however, be increased if changed circum-
stances are judged to justify increases. Loan rates for 
the 1976 feed grains md wheat crops were increased 
from earlier announced levels in October 19 7 6, when 
such a judgment was made, based on declines in market 
prices to near or below production costs. 
Due to a combin:ition of generally low target prices 
and relatively favorable market prices no deficiency pay-
ments were made in 1974 and 1975, and very little loan 
activity has occurred. This is reflected in the reduced 
Treasury expenditures for farm programs from $4 billion 
in 1972 to less than $0.5 billion in 1975. The total 
amount of deficiency and disaster payments any person 
may receive under the wheat, feed grain and cotton pro-
grams was limited to $20,000 (reduced from $55,000 in 
the 1970 act). This payment limitation, however, does 
not apply to price support loans, even though the loans 
may not be redeemed, or to set-aside payments. 
ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT PROVISIONS 
Levels under the 19 7 3 Act were generally viewed as 
satisfactory (both specified levels, adjustment proce-
dures and bounds for loan rate determination) when the 
legislation was enacted, but economic conditions since 
have led to their being criticized as unrealistically low 
(except in the case of rice). 
Most frequently mentioned alternatives deal with set-
ting the initial levels of support (target price and loan 
rate) at higher levels than currently prevail, and how 
subsequent adjustments in these levels will be made. 
Parity vs. Cost of Production 
Farm price supports, prior to target prices/deficiency 
payments, have been related to parity prices. Loan rates, 
except for upland cotton, are still related to this con-
cept. Various proposals have been advanced to move 
completely away from the parity concept to a cost of 
production index to set both target prices and loan 
rates. 
The parity price for a commodity is determined by a 
formula which gives this commodity the same purchas-
ing power, in terms of goods and services bought by 
farmr:rs. that it had in the 1910-14 base period. The 
parity price is then adjusted, to relate farm prices to the 
rest of the economy, through a factor obtained by di-
viding the commodity's most recent 10 year average 
farm price by the general price level for the 1910-14 
period. 
l'hc 111,qoi 1>b3ect1un u., the p. r., µn• c: co11•Tpl Las 
been that 1t only reflects prices <tt.d pncc changes, and 
does not take account of changes in technology and pro-
ductiYity. The costs of producing a bushel of wheat, 
however, reflects cha 11ges in both input prices and in 
output per unit of input. Thus, cost of production is 
\'iewcd by many as a more accurate measure of equi-
table price levels. Nevertheless, primarily because of its 
long history of use, the parity price of a commodity 
continues to be a standard by which many judge the 
adequacy of present prices. 
Cost of production studies were required by the 1973 
Act. The Economic Research Service, USDA, conducted 
a major survey and study of 1974 production costs of 
feed grains, wheat, cotton, and milk, and now updates 
those co~,ts annually. These data were used to "estab-
lish a current national weighted average cost of produc-
tion" for the selected commodities and could form the 
basis for indexing target price and loan rate levels to 
changes in production costs. 
Of course, the 1973 legislation made a major step 
away from the parity relationship and toward costs of 
production. But, while the notion of using production 
costs to establish and adjust loan rates and target prices 
has the appeal of simplicity and fairness, some serious 
inherent problems exist with its use. 
These problems arise both in measuring the cost of 
producing farm commodities and in linking target prices 
and loan rates to that cost. Major difficulties relating to 
measurement include (1) the lack of market-determined 
price information for the farmer's own labor and man-
agement, (2) the problems of computing a cost for the 
use of cropland and (3) the extreme variability in the 
cost of producing a farm commodity across the United 
States. Relative to the linkage problem, major difficul-
ties involve ( 1) the possibility of building in a land price-
cost spiral and (2) how high to set the level of target 
price and loan rate relative to the cost of production. 
The farmer and his family provide a significant share 
of the labor and management but what they actually 
get for their labor, management, and "owned" inputs is 
the difference between total cash receipts and total cash 
expenses. It is difficult to determine the true economic 
cost of these inputs. 
Land costs, based on current values and interest rates, 
make up from 25 to 50 percent of total production 
costs for most U.S. crops. But what determines this cur-
rent value? Much farmland is purchased for reasons 
other than production even when farmers are the buy-
ers. And most U.S. farmland was purchased at far less 
than current prices. 
There are several methods to compute the land costs 
and these methods give varying results. For 1974 aver-
age com production costs, the land charge could vary 
from $.44 to $1.15 per bushel depending upon the 
method by which land costs were computed. 
Other costs of production also vary widely among 
farms. Geographic location may substantially affect 
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both prices and costs of production. Costs vary widely 
because of the wide range in management skills of indi-
vidual producers. And size of farm affects cost per unit 
of output as operators of larger units are frequently able 
to achieve price ad\-antages in input purchases and prod-
uct sales. 
Level of Target Prices and Loan Rates 
The level of target price and loan rate depends much 
on the objectives of policy-makers. If market orienta-
tion is the major objective, relatively low levels will pro-
vide some protection against unusually low prices for 
the major crops. Some upward adjustment could still be 
made from 1976 lewls. 
On the other hand, target prices and loan rates can be 
viewed as devices to support U.S. farm income, a view 
generally prevailing in the l 960's. With this perspective, 
relatively high target price and loan rates are required to 
support farm prices which would normally be too low 
to cover costs of production. Market price would likely 
be continually lower than the target price and near the 
loan rate. Deficiency payments would be necessary in 
most years, government stocks would grow as farmers 
exercised their option not to pay off nonrecourse loans, 
and government expenditures on farm programs would 
climb from the relatiwly low levels of 1973-1976. 
Other Considerations 
Some concern has been expressed over the relative 
support levels established for the various covered crops. 
This concern arises primarily because initial levels and 
subsequent adjustments under both parity and cost of 
production concepts are not necessarily related to pre-
vailing market conditions. These concerns might be ad-
dressed by ( 1 ) allowing some degree of discretion in set-
ting levels to the Secretary of Agriculture, or (2) by link-
ing adjustments to a moving average of market prices. 
CONSEQUENCES 
Low Target Prices and Loan Rates 
A continuation of market-oriented policies, and at-
tendant relatively low support levels, will mean relatively 
greater price instability for producers and consumers 
than under prior programs. Producers would receive pro-
tection from seriously low prices through the target 
, price-loan rate mechanism but consumer protection 
from high prices would have to come through some 
other means - such as food reserves or ad hoc export 
embargos. Government pn.lgram costs would continue at 
a low level and commercial agricultural exports would 
continue to be competitin· in world markets. 
High Target Prices and Loan Rates 
Use of higher target prices and loan rates to support 
farm incomes. •:.n :ne u!hcr hand, would substantially 
decrease price uncen:;.imv t>n the part of both producers 
and consumers. The loan rate would essentially set the 
market price and gm-ernment farm program costs could 
be expected to increase substantially. Producers could 
also expect set-aside prO\isions to be invoked as a re-
quirement for price support loans as government stocks 
accumulated. These stocks could be used as a food re-
serve in times of widespread crop disaster, but might 
also have depressing cff ects on both food and farm 
pnces. 
If support levels were above world market prices, ad-
ditional government subsidies would be required to 
maintain our competitive position in international trade 
channels. This would also affect our general trade nego-
tiating position. 
Specific Consumer Consequences 
Consumers are affected by these alternatives primari-
ly in two ways: (l) directly, through the influence of 
support levels on food prices and (2) indirectly through 
taxes levied to finance the cost of the government pro-
gram. Under a low support level market-oriented pro-
gram, such as has resulted under the 19 7 3 Act, consu-
mers have faced somewhat higher food prices and in the 
absence of crop surpluses - considerably more price in-
stability. But costs of government farm programs have 
been substantially lower than in the past. 
Under higher support levels, and particularly in com-
bination with a reserves program, more stable prices and 
smaller price increases could be expected in the short 
run but higher government program costs would surely 
result. Should support rates be established at above 
equilibrium prices the longer term effects, higher feed 
prices leading to higher meat prices, could well lead to a 
boost in the overall rate of inflation. Meats make up 51 
percent of the food component in the consumer price 
index. 
Support Levels Tied to Costs of Production 
Tying target price and loan levels to costs of produc-
tion could, depending again upon the level of support, 
have substantial effects on the relative competitive posi-
tions of various regions, sizes of farm, and earlier versus 
recently purchased farms from the standpoint of land 
acquisition costs. It could also have substantial impact 
on farm structure, giving added incentives for larger, 
more capital intensive operations. This would make it 
even more difficult for young persons to enter farming 
and place added pressures on farmland prices. 
The importance of selecting an "appropriate" land 
charge becomes even more obvious. If the charge is too 
high and support rates based on it are above equilibrium 
price levels, then over production will result and depress 
prices even more, cause surpluses to accumulate and 
government costs to increase. Export sales could also 
suffer. Too low a land charge, of course, leads to pro-
tection only from serious price declines and little else. 
Yet, if the substantial procedural problems could be 
overcome, the use of cost of production as a guide for 
setting loan rates and target prices has inherent appeal 









W.E. Black, Texas A & M University 
Eric Thor, University of California l 
WHAT IS THE ISSUE? 
Acreage allotments were brought into being in the 
1930's to help raise farm prices. Acreage allotment ap-
portions to individual farmers the national acreage con-
sidered appropriate for balancing supply and demand for 
selected farm co"Ilmodities. Allotments are used (1) to 
control production and, (2) to distribute deficiency and 
disaster payments. 
For some crops the national requirements are ex-
pressed in volume rather than acreage terms. For such 
crops a national marketing quota sets forth the quantity 
of a particular commodity that, in general, will provide 
adequate and normal supplies. This quantity in turn is 
translated into acreage and allotted proportionately 
among states, counties and individual farms. 
Should allotments be eliminated as a basis for other 
programs, and if not should they be updated? If up-
dated, how? 
WHY IS IT AN ISSUE? 
Acreage allotments were originally established on a 
commodity basis for the purpose of raising farm prices 
and controlling production. Allotments were assigned to 
each farm on the basis of historical cropping patterns. 
The ~hort-fall on world production of grain in the 
early 1970's increased export demand for U.S. feed 
grains and wheat. U.S. and world prices rose, and farm 
production control programs came to an end except for 
tobacco, peanuts and extra long staple cotton. 
Acreage allotments, however, continued to be used as 
a basis for making deficiency and disaster payments un-
der the Agriculture Act of 1973. The shift away from 
production controls resulted in: (1) dramatically ex-
panded acreage of certain crops and, (2) regional shifts 
in the location of production. 
If the U.S. farm program goes back to acreage allot-
ments to limit production and increase prices, the ques-
tion exists as to whether the old allotments should be 
used as a basis for such programs or whether a new allot-
ment based upon a more recent production period 
should be established. If we do not go back to acreage 
allotments, the question arises as to the equity of limit-
ing payments on the basis of old allotments. 
Marketing quotas and acreage allotments were in ef-
fect for extra long staple cotton, peanuts, and most · 
kinds of tobacco in 1976. Rice deficiency payments and 
disaster payments are also based on acreage allotments. 
Current Situation 
Under the 1973 Agriculture and Consumer Protection 
Act acreage allotments were continued for feed grains 
(com, sorghum, barley), wheat and cotton as a basis of · 
granting government economic assistance to farmers. 
Target pric~s and disaster payments were applicable only 
to product10n on allotted acres. All production on 
farms with allotments is eligible for loans for upland 
cotton, feed grains and wheat. Allotments could be used 
for production control under the set-aside program at 
the discretion of the Secretary. 
Allotments have been assigned to farms based on his-
torical cropping patterns as follows: 
Crop 
Upland Cotton 


















Acreage allotments may be transferred between coun-
ties in a state for upland and extra long staple cotton, 
peanuts and 1976-1977 rice. The Secretary of Agricul-
ture can permit peanut acreage allotment transfers pro-
vided they do not add to total supply. The Secretary has 
no powers over transfers for both kinds of cotton or 
rice. Inter-county transfers of cotton allotments must be 
approved by the County ASCS Committee. Rice allot-
ments arc transferred between farmers in the same state 
without Secretary or County Committee approval. ' 
Any value attached to acreage allotment transfers be-
tween producers is privately negotiated. 
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Allotment transfers tend to reflect changes in area of 
production within each state. 
Other Alternath·es 
Among others. there are three major alternatives for 
the current system of acreage allotments. These are: 
(1) Allow tr:msfer of existing acreage allotments for 
all crops across county and state lines without Secretary 
of Agriculture or County Committee approval. 
(2) Update the acreage allotments by using the aver-
age production record on each farm for the most recent 
two to three years. 
(3) Make all current production eligible for support 
loans, target price deficiency payments and disaster pay-
ments without regard to acreage allotments. 
CONSEQUD;CES OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS 
Transfer Allotments 
This method allows current allotment holders to sell 
their allotments to farmers in areas where production is 
increasing. It would tend to concentrate production on 
fewer, but larger farms and may increase total output. 
Average yields would probably increase and average per 
unit production costs should decrease. 
Since this alternative would tend to boost total pro-
duction, agribusiness would have access to larger sup-
plies and more agricultural products would be available 
for export. Higher percentage of production would be 
produced in the least cost regions thus concentrating lo-
cation of agribusiness firms. 
Consumers will experience slower increase in total 
food costs relati,·e to the current program because of in-
creased supplies of farm products. There should be less 
variability in food supply from year to year. 
The agricultural production would move out of mar-
ginal production regions, lessening food related employ-
ment opportunities in those areas. Transfers of allot-
ments would gradually improve the efficiency of agri-
cultural production. 
Acreage allotment programs tend to restrict ability of 
U.S. to provide farm products for export. 
Update Allotments 
The economic consequences of this method are exactly 
th~ same as for.the tran.sfer allotment method, except it 
bnngs changes m lo~at1on of production more quickly 
an~ profoundly. T?1s method increases efficiency to 
agriculture more quickly than transfer of allotments and 
results in increased supply at lower cost. The incidence 
of allotment leases or sales would be temporarily elimi-
nated. 
Updating allotments would continue a basis for con-
trolling production and making deficiency and disaster 
payments to farmers. 
Eliminating Allotments 
This is the fastest method for shifting agricultural pro-
duction to least cost regions, and continuing shifts 
would continue to occur. Production efficiency would 
be ~aximized, cost per unit minimized and overall pro-
duct10n would be more responsive to market price 
changes. Farm income will be more concentrated than 
under other alternatives discussed. 
Consumers food prices will increase more slowly un-
der this system than under any other acreage allotment 
program. Farm prices will vary more and food supply 
would be less predictable. 
Cost to taxpayers would be less than other discussed 
alternatives if loan rates are kept well below world price 
le~~. . 
This method is consistent with the "Right to Food" 
resolution and should provide maximum exportable vol-
ume given favorable prices. It also provides the most 
sensitive basis for adjusting production to market needs. 
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PRODUCTION CONTROLS 
Rupert Johnston, Mississippi State University 
Ronald D. Knutson, Texas A&M University 
Production control involves government restrictions 
on the quantity of agricultural production. This may be 
accomplished by either controlling the quantity of in-
puts used in producing food and fiber or by restricting 
the quantity that can be marketed. Input control is gen-
erally accomplished by limiting the amount of land. 
WHAT IS THE ISSUE? 
Three major production control issues exist: (1) 
Should government control the quantity of food and 
fiber that is produced? (2) If a decision is made to con-
trol production, should it be done on an individual com-
modity basis or cover all commodities? (3) Should con-
trol be mandatory or voluntary for all producers? 
WHY IS IT AN ISSUE? 
U.S. agriculture has chronically been faced with prob-
lems of excess capacity, price fluctuation and low re-
turns. Many industries have been able to deal with these 
problems by some form of voluntary production control. 
Because of the large number of farmers, voluntary cut-
backs in production occur only after great economic 
hardship to farmers. 
Government efforts to support prices have encouraged 
production, reduced demand and are costly. The result 
in the 1950's and 60's was extensive governmental pro-
duction control programs. L'p to 60 million acres of 
land was retired from production in some years. In ad-
dition, mandatory control programs existed on a num-
ber of commodities .. Much debate surrounded the merits 
of these programs. 
Opponents argued that they increased production 
costs, resulted in resource misallocations, were ineffec-
tive and denied farmer freedom to produce. Proponents 
saw production controls as the only feasible means of 
tailoring production to market needs, eliminating excess 
capacity, keeping farm program costs in a reasonable 
range and raising farm income. 
Rapidly expanding demand in the J 970's resulted in 
ending of government land retirement programs. Re-
maining production control programs such as for rice 
and peanuts were strongly criticized as being contrary t 
the public interest in expanding production to fill bot 
domestic and foreign food and fiber needs at reasonabl 
prices. Production controls were discontinued on rice. 
Some suggest that the problem of overcapacity i 
past. Yet large surpluses of rice exist. Wheat prices hav 
fallen below full costs of production. Another year o 
high wheat production could result in record stocks, ex 
tremely depressed prices, or unacceptably high prograrrf: 
costs. Pressures therefore, exist for production control 
in the U.S. while total world stocks of grain are relai 
tively low and problems of malnutrition exist. ! 
CURRENT SITUATION -THE 1973 ACT 
Some of the control provisions of the Agriculture Act 
of 1970 and earlier legislation were continued in the 
Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 19 7 3. The 
1973 Act provides authority for the Secretary of Agri-
culture to establish cropland set-aside and additional di-
verted acres and use acreage allotments if he determines 
that these actions are necessary for wheat, feed grain, or 
upland cotton. Wheat and cotton marketing quotas were 
suspended through 19 77. 
Cropland Set-asides. The Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection Act of 1973 authorizes the use of cropland 
set-asides for upland cotton, wheat, and feed grains 
(corn, grain sorghum, and barley). The Rice Production 
Act of 197 5 authorizes set-asides for rice. 
If the Secretary of Agriculture finds that greater re-
strictions are necessary, he can ask for diversions beyond 
the set-aside requirement. Farmers who make these addi-
tional adjustments are entitled to compensation. There 
has been no set-aside of cropland under the Act of 1973. 
Set-asides were not used because supplies were not ex-
cessive and the department wanted to encourage pro-
duction. 
Marketing quotas are currently in effect for extra-
long staple (ELS) cotton, peanuts, and most kinds of 
tobacco. Quotas had also been used for wheat and up-
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land cotton, but these were suspended by legislation in 
the 1960's and later by the 1973 Act for 1974-77. 
After proclamation, quotas go into effect only if ap-
prowd by two-thirds of the producers voting in a na-
tional referendum. If ratified, all producers who are not 
1rranted exemptions arc penalized for any production 
from acreage in excess of that assigned under their allot-
ment. The crop grown on the farm allotment acreage 
may be considered as the farm quota. 
ALTERNATIVES 
Alternatives exist with respect to whether production 
control programs are to be used, whether they are to be 
applied on a commodity or general basis, and whether 
they are to be voluntary or mandatory. 
umtrol or No Controls 
The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority under 
the 1973 Act to establish a set-aside. This authority 
could be extended in the new farm legislation, modified 
or removed. Modification would likely reduce the dis-
cretion of the Secretary in applying controls and in-
crease provisions for mandatory controls. 
General or Commodity Controls 
Surplus conditions currently exist only in rice and 
wheat. Incentives will exist to address these problems 
on a commodity basis and thus impose production con-
trols only on rice and wheat. Commodity controls have 
been tried before. The effect has been to cut back on 
the production of the controlled commodity but use 
acreage to expand production of other commodities. 
Thus the surplus problem tends to be transferred from 
controlled product to those not controlled. Controls 
gradually spread across agriculture. General set-~sid~s 
which apply to all commodities are more effective m 
dealing with a general problem of excess capacity in ag-
riculture and allow greater producer freedom and flexi-
bility in adjusting production patterns. 
Voluntary or Mandatory Controls 
If controls are to be established on either a com-
moditv or general basis thev can be either voluntary or 
mand~torv. Voluntary cont~ols exist when the producer 
has a ch~ice of whether or not he participates in the 
program. Under voluntary controls the govern~ent pays 
so much per acre to the producer for plac~ng his land m 
the set-aside program. Payments must be high enough t? 
induce the farmer to put the land in the program._ Add~­
tional incentives are frequently provided by makmg eli-
gibility for price support or deficiency payments con-
tingent on set-aside. . . 
~fandatorv controls are normally imposed only 1f 
two-thirds of the producers vote for them. They may be 
combined with marketing quotas to make the produc-
tion control program more effective. Producer com~en­
sation for mandatory controls is usually limited to high-
er product prices and resulting appreciation in land or 
~llotment values. 
CONSEQUENCES 
Producers benefit from production control programs 
in the form of higher prices, less price variability and ap-
preciation in land or allotment values. The more effec-
tive the program is in controlling production, the great-
er the benefits to existing producers. So mandatory pro-
grams arc more effective in raising prices than voluntary 
commodity programs. If programs are on only a few 
commodities, those producers' benefits may be at the 
expense of producers of commodities for which produc-
tion is not controlled. In addition for any production 
control program, present producers benefit at the ex-
pense of future producers. Future producers must pay 
the cost resulting from higher land or allotment values. 
Agribusiness generally opposes production control 
programs because they reduce volume of products pro-
duced. However, producers may compensate for reduced 
acreage by applying more inputs such as fertilizer to the 
remaining land. Thus reduction in inputs and produc-
tion is frequently less than might be anticipated unless 
acreage controls are combined with strict quotas. 
Foreign consumers experience less supplies available 
at higher prices. If there is a crop failure on reduced 
acreage the effect for foreign consumers might be dis-
astrous because the United States is an important source 
of supply and is likely to take care of domestic needs 
first, even if it means imposing export controls. 
U.S. consumers also experience higher prices. These 
higher prices result because supply is restricted and cost 
of production is increased. 
Government involvement is greatly increased by pro-
duction control programs. On the other hand, govern-
ment costs can actually be reduced. For example, the 
tobacco production control program is a low cost pro-
gram. On the other hand, the peanut production con-
trol program has a high cost because of high price sup-
ports in addition to acreage restriction. 
One danger in imposing production controls in the 
current situation is that if a crop failure should occur it 
could result in a public rebellion against all farm pro-
grams or result in substantially greater government regu-
lation of agriculture. On the other hand, if production is 
not controlled and support prices are raised substan-
tially, government costs could become so high that all 
farm programs would be abandoned. Thus a real dilem-
ma currently exists over the production control issue. 
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SPECIAL COMMODITY PROGRAMS 
Harold D. Guither* 
University of Illinois 
The 1973 Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act 
established price and income support programs for 
wheat, feed grains, and upland cotton using a combina-
tion of target prices, deficiency payments, and crop-
land set aside. A similar program was established for rice 
in 1975 and became effective for 1976 and 1977. 
What is the Issue? 
Special Commodity programs for peanuts, tobacco, 
and extra long staple cotton have continued, based on 
the authority from the Agricultural Acts of 1938 and 
1949, outside the 19 7 3 act. Dairy and wool and mohair 
have had special programs based on other legislation. 
Sugar was handled under special legislation until 1974. 
The major issue for these remaining individual com-
modity programs is (1) whether they cbntinue to oper-
ate separately with the special requirements and control 
programs, or (2) whether they can or should be inte-
grated into those support programs that would use tar-
get prices, lower level loan rates and deficiency pay-
ments, and place less restriction on producers. 
Underlying this issue with each of the special com-
modity programs is what the appropriate role of sup-
ports should be. Are they to stabilize prices and supplies 
or should they guarantee a return for each producer? 
The role of target prices also needs to be examined 
along with where loan rates would be set when target 
prices are in effect. Are there special conditions that 
warrant special treatment for a commodity different 
than those now used for the majority of the agricultural 
output from wheat, feed grains, rice and cotton? 
DAIRY PRODUCTS 
Under current legislation dairy products are support-
ed through government purchases to maintain prices at 
75 to 90 percent of parity. Although the basic price sup-
port le2"islation goes back to the Agricultural Act of 
1949, revisions and modifications were made in the Acts 
*Counseling assistance was received from IJonaJd £. Anderson, !liorth 
Dakota State l'niversity; Robert S. Firch, Cni•-cnity of Arizona; Harold G. 
Love, University of Kentucky; Boyd \I. Buxton, Cnivenity of Minnesota; 
and many staff members of the Economic Resarch &rvicc, U.S. Depart· 
ment of Agriculture. 
of 1970 and 1973. Currently, manufactured milk is sup! 
• 1 .. ported nat10nally at $8.26 per hundred pounds or aboui 
81 percent of parity. ' 
The authority for federal market orders comes froni 
the Agricultural Marketing Act of 19 3 7. The objectivq: 
was to stabilize prices for producers and assure add 
quate supplies for consumers. : 
Existing legislative authority for Class I and seasona( 
base plans under federal orders, for transfer of ccq 
stocks to the military and Veterans Administration, an~ 
for dairy indemnity payments, are scheduled to expird 
at the end of 1977. 
What are the Issues? 
' In 19 7 7, three major issues most likely to be discussed! 
are (1) level of support for milk; (2) whether the support! 
price should be adjusted quarterly or semi-annually; (3)~ 
whether the Class I Base plan should continue. ·· 
A key issue with present dairy programs centers 
around the mechanisms for setting support levels. Com-
monly discussed alternatives are: ( 1) continue to use 7 5 
to 90 percent of parity range and let the government 
buy to keep manufacturing milk prices at the minimum 
figure announced by the Secretary of Agriculture; or (2) 
use a cost of production figure as a basis for support. 
The use of parity in setting price support levels is ·. 
questioned because the index includes many items be- . 
sides dairy farmers' production inputs. 
Use of average production cost figures is stimulating ; 
considerable interest and discussion. Costs vary from 
state to state, by size of farm, and by management abili-
ty of the dairy farmer. They vary directly with feed 
costs and beef prices. 
Support prices for manufactured dairy products have 
been adjusted annually under past legislation. With 
rapidly changing prices for feed and other inputs, a 
quarterly or semi-annual adjustment would more closely 
place support levels in line with changing production 
costs. However, higher support prices based on nsmg 
costs will not reflect consumer demand. 
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Class I base plans were established in the Agricul-
tural Act of 1970 and continued through 1977 in the 
197 3 Act. They are currently in effect in only two mar-
kets. The mai~ question is whether production bases 
using historic production should continue or be drop-
ped. To continue authorization would permit a type of 
monopoly control of supply that is counter to the direc-
tion of other commodity programs. But some producer 
groups ha\·e indicated support for the plan as a mean~ of 
controlling supply in a period when stocks may be bmld-
ing up. Discontinuing the plan would mean some loss of 
capital rnlue in the bases owned by producers in those 
areas where the Class I Base Plan is in operation. 
Some more fundamental policy questions revolve 
around the need to make major modifications in the 
federal-state order system of classified pricing for milk 
and dairy products. Some suggest eliminating the present 
program while others would modify it. These issues are 
not likely to get major attention in 19 77. 
PEANUTS 
The present peanut program dates back to 1949. 
Prices are supported by marketing quotas and by non-
recourse loans provided through the three peanut grow-
ers associations. The Secretary is required by law to pro-
pose marketing quotas every year, regardless of supply. 
More than two-thirds of all peanut producers have ap-
proved the marketing quotas in a referendum for the 
past 30 years. The loan level can be set at ? 5 to 9 0 per-
cent of parity depending upon supply. Without qu?ta 
approval, support would be a~ 50 percei:it of panty. 
Under marketing quotas penalties are applied to the ex-
cess production of growers who do not comply with 
their acreage allotments. 
In 1976, the average support level was 20.7¢ pe;· 
pound, the 75 percent of parity minimum. Prices to 
growers are expected to average 20.5¢ per pound. 
In recent vears, the national allotment have been set 
at the minidium allowed by law of 1.6 million acres. 
Surpluses have built up as yields have risen faster than 
the demand for edible peanuts. It is expected that one-
fourth of the 1976 crop of 3,671 million pounds will be 
acquired by the government. . . 
To reduce its inventory, the CCC mst1tuted a toll 
crush program in 1975 by which crushers acquired ~w~­
ership of the meal but delivered the. oil to CCC._ This 011 
is used for manufacture of shortenmg, margarine, and 
cooking and salad oils, which are distributed through do-
mestic and foreign donation programs. 
Policy Alternatives 
Polin· makers face these alternatives for peanuts: (I) 
keep th~ present program with the marketing quotas; (2) 
keep the present program but further reduce allotments 
to balance supplies with demand for whole peanut uses; 
(3) set up a two price system with a higher p1~ice _for us: 
of whole peanuts and a lower pric~ for crushm_g mto 011 
and me2l: f 41 shiit to " program with target pnces, Iow-
a loan rates, and deficiency payments similar to wheat 
and feed grains; (5) shift to a program similar to soy-
beans where there are no acreage allotments and with 
loan rates near average market prices. 
Consequences: 
{l) The present program with no changes would re-
sult in further accumulation of government stocks, loss 
of foreign markets, higher government costs and no 
price change for U.S. consumers. . . 
(2) Reducing acreage allotments to brmg product10n 
in line with demand for edible uses of whole peanuts 
would reduce government costs but also reduce incomes 
of peanut producers and result in a capital loss from the 
reduction of their allotments. Consumers would still pay 
as much for peanuts and peanut products. Foreign trade 
would be reduced since prices would be above the world 
market and most domestic output would be used in this 
country. 
(3) Establishing a two price system was seriously con-
sidered by Congress in 19 7 6 and is likely to be consid-
ered again. Such a program would offer growers less in-
come from part of their crop but would open the way 
for expanding production for oil and meal uses. Gov-
ernment costs for storage of surplus would be reduced. 
Consumers would pay as much for products made from 
whole peanuts, but prices for peanut oil and meal could 
be reduced if supplies were adequate. Foreign trade in 
peanut oil and meal could be increased. Some govern-
ment costs for the program would be involved in admin-
istering the program but probably less than the current 
program. . 
( 4) Shifting to a system of target pnces, lo~n rates, 
and deficiency payments would place peanuts m a pro-
gram similar to other major commodities. It would mean 
lower returns per acre for peanuts than now received by 
producers under the restrictive program. However, t~is 
program should give producers more freedom to shift 
from one crop to another and peanut acreage could shift 
from smaller to larger, lower cost producers. 
Level of target prices and loan rates would be a key 
question as to how producers would react and govern-
ment costs would be affected. Producers income from 
peanuts might not change very much from the current 
program, but they would suffer some capital loss from 
reduced allotment values. Consumers would probably 
see slight declines in prices of peanuts and peanut prod-
ucts but not very significant. Costs of marketing and 
processing would continue and make ~p a large ~art of 
the retail price to consumers. Internat10nal trade m pea-
nut products could increase if market prices were com-
petitive with world market prices or if the government 
subsidized exports. 
(5) Shifting to a program similar to soybeans would 
bring considerable reductions in incomes from growers 
but would be the least costly to government. ConsL1mers 
would have the lowest prices for peanut products if han 
rates were set in line with market prices. Total outp, 1t 
could decline especially in high production cost areas. 
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~~OOL 
The wool support pr•>gram was first authorized under 
che !\:ational Wool Ac 1if 195+ with extension to 1977 
in the 19 7 3 Act. The Wool program was enacted by Con-
gress on the assumption that (1) wool is an essent;al and 
strategic commodity which the C.S. does not produce in 
sufficient quantities and grades to meet the domestic 
needs, and (2) desired domestic production is impaired 
by depressing effects in world markets. 
An incentive price is established. Farmers sell their 
wool on the market and if average prices received by all 
producers is less than the incentive price, a producer gets 
a deficiency payment bzsed on the percentage difference 
between the incentive .md average market price and the 
returns received by each individual producer. Payments 
have been made every year except 1973. 
The issues in the wool program involve the cost to the 
government and whether the payments are really pro-
viding an incentive to produce more wool, and promo-
tion efforts are really helping U.S. producers. Domestic 
wool production has dropped each year since 1960. 
Policy Alternatives 
The policy alternatives include: (1) continue the pre-
sent incentive program; (2) discontinue all payments and 
support prices; (3) and modify the support program by 
establishing a loan rate at a set price. 
Continuing the present program would save the gov-
ernment the cost of payments which have ranged from 
zero to $ll0 million annually since 1972. However, this 
cost is paid by revenue from import duties which would 
probably be decreased if the wool incentive program 
were discontinued. Producers might receive less income 
from wool and reduce their production still further. 
Shifting to a straight commodity support program 
would reduce risk for producers from fluctuating world 
prices. It could result in government costs for storage of 
wool in years when prices dropped below the loan rate. 
If the loan program did not provide any incentive to in-
crease pr:::.duction, or discouraged production, then more 
wool woaid have to be imported to meet domestic needs. 
TOBACCO 
Tobacco support programs date back to the Agri-
cultural Acts of 19 38 and 1949, as amended. Marketing 
quotas and loans made to growers through their market-
ing associations are used to support each of the major 
classes - burley, flue-cured, Puerto Rican, sun-cured and 
cigar, dark air cured, and dark fire cured. 
The major issues in the current tobacco programs are: 
(1) whether tobacco should continue under strict con-
trol of production and marketing; (2) whether supports 
should be shifted to respond more with the relative mar-
ket value of different types of tobacco; and (3) whether 
government funds should be used to encourage produc-
tion of a commodity that carries risks to health. 
Policy Alternatives and Consequences 
Four possible policy alternati\·es for tobacco are: (1) 
keep the present program with its restricted control of 
acreage <1nd marketing quotas; (2 1 modd y the program 
to a system of target prices, support loans and deficiency 
payments; (3) allow transfer of leases to interregional 
and interstate basis; ( ! ) eliminate all price support and 
acreage control progi-ams. 
By maintaining the present program, many small 
farmers would continue to get the benefits of a high re-
turn from their restricted acreage allotment. Govern-
ment costs are relatively small but have been going up as 
CCC stocks have risen. Present support prices do not 
fully reflect the market usability of the tobacco leaves. 
Overseas prnducers are increasing output and may pro-
vide competition for our producers. 
By shifting to a system of target prices, support loans! 
and deficiency payments, producers would be protected!. 
against some risk, prices could reflect the value of vari-/ 
ous grades, and government costs could decline unless! 
deficiency payments were high. However, incomes oH 
producers could decline, and some small growers might! 
be forced out as larger, more efficient producers expand! 
production, if they were permitted to do so. If permit-! 
ted, acreage allotments would likely shift to productions 
on larger, lower cost producing farms. . 
If all tobacco programs were eliminated, production[ 
would move to larger farms, become more mechanized,! 
and many small farmers could no longer compete orl 
would have sharply lower incomes. Moreover, there l 
would be a considerable impact on the value of the land.! 
The current market value for leases to produce tobacco I 
is 25 cents per pound. This is the value of the allotment 
and does not include land, buildings, or equipment. 
Should farmers be compensated for loss of the capital 
value of their allotments? 
Incomes of tobacco producers would decline. If many 
of the small producers did not have the income from 
tobacco, they would be forced to produce lower value 
crops, accept much lower incomes, and even be forced 
to apply for welfare aid assistance in some cases. 
Small towns would suffer as smaller producers would 
have less income to spend for production and consumer 
goods. Consumers would pay about as much for tobacco 
products under any system since raw tobacco is only a 
small part of the total cost of manufactured products. 
The health issue is the main argument made by some 
who want to eliminate tobacco price support programs. 
They argue that the government should not spend mon-
ey to promote a product that may cause serious health · 
problems, when it is also spending money to discourage 
use of tobacco products as harmful to health. 
Foreign trade in tobacco could be increased if pro· 
ducers can compete in the world market. Some classes 1 
of tobacco are more dependent on foreign trade than 
others. From 50 to 60 percent of flue cured production 
has traditionally been exported as compared to 10 per- ' 
cent or less of the burley crop. Flue cured exports have 
been shrinking. Under the present restricted marketing 
quotas system and high support prices that do not fully 
reflect the most usable products, tobacco exports are ' 
adversely affected. E-3 
EXTRA LONG STAPLE COTION 
The extra long staple cotton, (ELS), program includes 
acreage allotments, marketing quotas, nonrecoursc loans 
and supplementary payments. ELS is a special type of 
cotton that makes up less than one percent of the total 
U.S. cotton production. Upland cotton is the major 
type and produces most of the total i~com~ of cotton 
producers. Most ELS cotton is grown m Arizona, New 
Mexico and west Texas. Only about 2,000 growers are 
involved in the program. 
The costs of producing an acre of upland and ELS 
cotton are quite close, but the yield of ELS is only 
about 60 percent as much. Special ginning equipment is 
also required to handle ELS cotton. Many growers in 
1976 did not use their allotments because of high irri-
gation costs and the lower yields of ELS cot~o~. Do-
mestic production is less than needs and some is impor-
ted to make up the deficiency. The 19 7 6 planted acre-
age was only about two-thirds of the national allotment. 
Policy alternatives are: (1) keep the present program 
to provide an incentive to produce a specialize~ com-
modity. Loan rates have been under market prices ~o 
CCC has not acquired stocks. Payments are the mam 
government cost. (2) Shift to no program and let mills 
contract with growers at a price to cover growers costs 
and some incentive to grow the crop; (3) Shift to a tar-
get price and deficiency loan program similar to upland 
cotton. Government administrative costs could be re-
duced if the program could be handled along with other 
cotton. Deficiency payments could be less than current 
payments that are made irregardless of market price. 
Unless ELS production is maintained or increased, 
mills will import more of this special cotton. 
Consumers would not be affected much by any pro-
gram alternative since the costs of. ELS produ~ts. are 
higher and few consumers buy this very specialized 
product. . 
The ELS gin operators would be affected ~f produc-
tion were completely eliminated, but more hkely con-
tracts would keep some production in this country. 
SUGAR 
The Jones-Costigan Act of 1934 and the Sugar Acts 
of 1937 and 1948 formed the basis of U.S. sugar pro-
grams until 1974. After the Secretary of :.\griculture had 
determined total needs, quotas were assigned to domes-
tic and foreign producing areas that would mai~tain tar-
get price levels. In the latter part of the Act, prices were 
established by using a formula composed of farm pro-
duction costs and the Consumer Price Index. 
The Act which expired in 19 H, had the goals of pro-
viding stable retail price to consume~·s and r~asonable r~­
turns to domestic sugar growers. which pronded a profit 
above the cost of production. The .-\ct also regulated 
labor relations with migratory workers. import tariffs, 
excise taxes, and the importation of sugar products. 
Sugar is an unique commodity in that high capital in-
vestments in processing facilities are required near areas 
of production. So an unstable market is a strong deter-
rent to capital investment. When sugar prices fall, farm-
ers shift to other crops leaving the processor without the 
raw commodity to process. Virtually all other countries 
of the world have price stabilization programs in their 
domestic markets and long term trade commitments to 
stabilize their exports. 
Policy Alternatives and Consequences 
For sugar, the policy alternatives include: (1) con-
tinue to operate as in 19 7 5 and 19 7 6 with high import 
quotas and low level import duties; (2) reinstate the 
Sugar Act that expired in 1974; (3) set up variable im-
port duties to stabilize prices; ( 4) join the International 
Sugar Agreement; (5) have the government buy foreign 
sugar and resell it in the U.S. market at administered 
prices; (6) set up direct payments to producers based on 
the target price concept, along with domestic produc-
tion controls. 
If the U.S. decides to operate without new legislation, 
some believe that the likely results will be a gradual de-
mise of the domestic sugar industry as present capital 
investment is depleted; extremely volatile prices, and 
uncertain supplies during periods of short world supply. 
Reinstating the previous sugar program would protect 
producers in this country by controlling imports more 
closely. Consumers would pay slightly more for sugar 
but prices would be more stable. 
The government would be more involved under any 
program that would require setting prices and distribu-
ting import or domestic production quotas, for in effect, 
it would determine the rights of foreign and domestic 
producers to a share of the U.S. sugar market. 
Technological development in producing high fructose 
corn syrup opened the way for U.S. produced corn 
sweeteners to compete for certain uses of regular cane 
or beet sugar. High sugar prices in 1974 and 1975 stimu-
lated the demand. Any sugar program will influence the 
level and stability of demand and prices for all sweeten-
ers produced in this country. 
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WHAT ARE THE ISSUES? 
The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 
1973 initiated a new program to protect producers who 
have wheat, feed grain, or upland cotton allotments 
against income losses due to prevented planting or low 
yields for the period 197 4-77. In the first two years 
(1974-75) of the Disaster Payment Program (DPP) ad-
ministered by the USDA's Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service (ASCS), payments totaled $840 
million. Without legislative action, the DPP and associa-
ted benefits will expire after the 19 7 7 crop. The immedi-
ate issue is whether Congress should extend the DPP in-
tact or in some modified form. 
This question is only part of the broader issue of the 
proper role of Government in offering risk protection 
against natural hazards faced by farmers. The Federal 
Government also has programs other than the DPP 
which offer risk protection to farmers, as does the pri· 
vate insurance industry. The Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC) is a federally chartered agency 
which has offered insurance to farmers since 1939. Even 
considering all 22 crops insured by FCIC, the DPP is 
still a much larger program in terms of participation and 
payments or indemnities to farmers. In comparison, 
FCIC paid out a total of $126 million in 1974 and 1975. 
Other disaster protection is also available through 
such programs as the Farmer's Home Administration 
(FmHA), but most of this relief is of an emergency na-
ture and is restricted by the requirement that a disaster 
be declared by the President, a Governor, or other offi-
cial. Such federal programs supplement the private in-
surance industry which has traditionally offered protec-
tion against hail and fire, but which has never success-
fully offered multiple-peril insurance on a large scale. 
Within the broad issue of the proper role of the Gov-
ernment in providing risk protection to farmers, specific 
questions relate to the type of programs that should be 
available. Should both the DPP and Federal Crop Insur-
ance (FCI) continue for the program crops? Should the 
Government in some way encourage the private insur-
ance industry to provide multiple-peril crop insurance? 
Should provisions of any of the programs be revised. 
Should the DPP be expanded to include other crops 
such as soybeans, oats, or tobacco? Should the overlap, 
among these Government programs be eliminated? How 
should the programs be structured - what should the 
payment rates be, who should pay the cost of 
urns, and what losses should be covered? 
WHY IS THIS AN ISSUE? 
Farmer's increased need for disaster protection as 
duction costs increase, apparent inadequacies in the cur-
rent programs to meet these needs, apparent abuses 
inequities in the present programs, and the high Govern-
ment ex pen di tures since 19 7 4 make disaster protection 
an issue. The DPP was adopted with little consideration 
of how the specific provisions would work and with lit-
tle knowledge of its likely costs to the Government. It 
has proven to be costly and several weaknesses in its pro-
visions have become apparent from experience gained 
during the first two years of operation. 
Specific problems with the current DPP are numerous. 
l\1any of the provisions would not be offered in a sound 
insurance program. 
1. The payment rate of the larger of either one-third 
of the target price or the established deficiency pay-
ment rate is considerably below costs of production. 
2. While farm allotments and bases have not been 
used for production control since 1973, they are still 
preserved by ASCS as a basis for the DPP. Benefits are 
based upon the short fall between the actual production 
and the farm's base production (allotment times the 
ASCS established yield) making producers without allot-
ments ineligible for benefits. Those who overplant their 
allotments face reduced per acre benefits or no benefits. 
3. The determination of eligibility for benefits is 
based upon two-thirds of the established yield, but once 
a farm is eligible, payments are based upon the entire 
short fall between established allotment production and 
actual production. As a result, one bushel or pound of 
F-1 
production above the critical eligibility level can make a 
producer ineligible for a large payment. 
4. The provision which allows producers to receive 
payments if prevented from planting is difficult to ad· 
minister and subject to abuse. 
5. Cotton receives special treatment under the pre-
wnted planting option since benefits can be received 
even if another crop is planted later. If a producer plants 
a substitute crop for wheat or feed grains his payment is 
reduced proportional to production from the substitute 
crop. 
On the positive side, the DPP has been beneficial and 
may have kept numerous farmers out of bankruptcy 
during unfavorable crop conditions. Many farmers like 
the program because it offers disaster protection with-
out a premium cost. Farmers in high risk areas where 
FCI is unavailable now have protection against natural 
crop hazards - with the increased specialization of farms 
and higher costs of production, this protection is impor-
tant as a means to guard against loss of income. 
The DPP is in a sense in competition with the FCIC. 
Farmers eligible for the DPP may be less inclined to pur-
chase FCI than if the DPP were not available. However, 
not all producers are able to purchase FCI since the en-
abling legislation requires FCIC to operate a sound pro-
gram with authority to refuse insurance where the risks 
are excessive. 
As a result, FCI is not offered in many counties or 
even in areas or to producers within counties where the 
risks of crop failure are high. Even where available, FCI 
has a low level of participation with only about 1 7 per-
cent of the eligible acreage of wheat, com, barley,grain 
sorghum and cotton insured in 19 7 6. 
The private insurance industry has misgivings about 
both the FCI and the DPP because such programs may 
hurt their present or potential sales. Private industry has 
long been interested in providing multiple-peril coverage 
of crops and has attempted to do so in the past. How-
ever, these efforts have been unsuccessful because of the 
unavailability of reinsurance to spread the risks over 
time, lack of data on which to base rates, and having to 
compete with the FCIC which receives a Treasury appro-
priation to cover ~dministrative and operating expenses. 
Policy Alternatives 
A wide range of options may be considered for adop-
tion through new legislation. 
1. Renew the DPP without modifying any of its pro-
visions in the 19 7 3 Act. 
2. Allow DPP to expire and allow the FCIC to con-
tinue operating under its present charge. Disaster pro-
tection would then be the same as before the 1973 Act 
was passed. 
3. Encourage the private insurance industry to offer 
multiple-peril crop insurance. This might be accom-
plished by offering FCIC reinsurance to help spread the 
risks over time. 
-1-. Terminate the DPP and expand the FCIC program. 
Cnder this option, FCI co\·eragc would be made nation-
wide for the program crops and the now minimal effort 
at selling and promoting FCI would be expanded. Gov-
ernment premium subsidy could be used to increase the 
-articipation in the program. 
5. Amend the DPP provisions to make the protection 
more in line with the needs of producers and to remove 
some of its unsound provisions. This includes the un-
equal treatment between cotton and the other crops 
with respect to the prevented planting provisions and 
the problems associated with making a payment of at 
least one-third of the maximum possible payment on the 
basis of a threshold farm yield. 
6. Eliminate the current overlap between programs. 
Thi'> could be accomplished in a number of ways such as 
requiring the purchase of FCI if available in order to be 
eligible for disaster payments or not offering the DPP to 
producers who were eligible to purchase FCI. 
7. Expand the emergency loan program offered by 
FmHA and the disaster assistance offered by other agen-
cies to reach more producers. 
Consequences 
The results of any action taken by the Congress will 
affect the extent of coverage of natural disasters that 
are faced by farmers, the rate at which they are indemni-
fied, and the costs of this protection to taxpayers. The 
ability of farmers to purchase inputs and obtain credit 
in years of low crop yield are substantially dependent 
upon the level of disaster protection provided. 
To the extent that benefits are capitalized in the land 
values, any governmental role in financing the program 
could affect the prices paid and received for land. Farm 
income protection is important not only to farmers but 
also to their communities. 
Beyond the farm gate, the impact of farmer disaster 
protection on consumers is difficult to evaluate. How-
ever, there is evidence that reducing the risks associated 
with crop production would increase the supplies of 
food and reduce food costs in the long run. 
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EXPORT AND IMPORT POLICIES 
Ronald D. Knutson, Texas A & M Univusity 
V.L. Sorenson, Michigan State University 
WHAT IS THE ISSUE? 
Grain export embargoes, beef and dairy imports have 
made export and import controls major food policy is-
sues. The issue of import and export controls involves 
the conditions under which foreign producers and con-
sumers are to have access to U.S. markets as either sell-
ers or buyers. The nature of the issue varies depending 
upon whether the general economic and specific com-
modity situation is one of short supply and high prices 
or surpluses and low prices as indicated below: 
U.S. Controls 
Supply 
Situation Export Import 
1. Embargoes 1. Increase quotas 
Short 2. Licensing 2. Lower tariffs 
Supply 3. State trader 3. Trade agreements 
4. Trade agreements 
1. Subsidies 1. Increase tariffs 
Surplus 2. Two price plans 2. Lower quotas 
3. P.L. 480 3. Other nontariff 
4. Trade agreements 4. Trade agreements 
If the situation is one of short supply and high export 
demand consumer and government pressures build to 
impose export controls. Such controls may be in the 
form of export embargoes, export licensing, trade agree-
ments or the government could become the exporter as 
a state trader. 
Trade agreements may be used to ration supplies 
among major customers by providin~ both minimums 
and maximums on shipments. In times of short supply, 
on the other hand, trade agreements may be used as a 
form of import controls to assure a supply of commodi-
ties imported such as sugar or coffee. The U.S. might 
also react to a short supply situation by lowering tariffs, 
increasing quotas or even subsidizing imports. 
In a surplus situation the problem is one of low prices, 
insufficient demand and excess foreign competition. The 
reaction is one of moving commodities out of the U.S. 
and preventing them from being imported. Export assist-
ance in the form of subsidies, plans which price exports 
at a lower level than domestic sales, shipments under 
P.L. 480 are proposed and frequently adopted. Trade 
agreements are viewed in the context of providing an as-
sured market and incentives exist to establish interna-• 
tional commodity agreements among exporters for a 
minimum price floor. Problems of excessive foreign 
competition are dealt with by pressures to impose tar-
iffs, quotas, or other nontariff barriers to products en-i 
tering the U.S. Informal trade or "orderly marketing"( 
agreements are sometimes negotiated. ! 
! WHY IS IT AN ISSUE? i 
Both foreign producers and consumers want access t4 
our markets. Foreign consumers and livestock producer! 
want access to our grain. For grain the U.S. represent ' 
one of only a few major excess supply sources. Acces 
to it can actually mean the difference between the avail 
ability of food and shortage. At home, however, U.S 
consumers apply pressure on public officials to contro 
or stabilize rising food prices by limiting exports. Pro. 
ducers fear embargoes will both destroy foreign ma 
kets and be used to place an upper limit on prices. ! 
Surpluses bring calls by grain producers for expor 
subsidies and from livestock and milk producers for im 
port controls. Both beef and dairy producers sugges · 
that import controls are necessary if they are to produc 
the quality and quantity of beef and milk demanded 
Despite particular protectionist policy, the U.S. gov 
ernment has historically expounded the virtues of fre 
trade in agricultural products. It has been a leader in ef 
forts to negotiate lower trade barriers. This policy ha 
both selfish economic and humanitarian basis. From ar 
economic standpoint U.S. producers have had lowe 
production costs for major food and feed grains tha 
most other countries. From a humanitarian standpoint 
free trade results in more food being available to mor 
people of the world at a lower cost. f 
Exports are critical to a prosperous farm economyf 
Food and fiber exports are necessary to pay for th9 
products we import, especially oil. 1 G-1 i 
THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Legislation for export controls in situations of short 
supply is provided by the Export Administration Act. 
This Act gives the President the power to impose con-
trols for three reasons: a short supply situation, foreign 
policy or national security. The President has substan-
tial discretion in determining when these reasons are 
satisfied. The President also has substantial latitude to 
reduce import tariffs or increase quotas in a short supply 
situation as was done in the case of beef and dairy im-
ports in the early 1970's. 
For surplus situations much of the export assistance 
and import protection stems from the need to comple-
ment U.S. target and price support programs and con-
trol program costs. 
Beef and sugar are special cases in that import 
quotas are not tied to price supports. In beef and tex-
tiles, quota restrictions have been supplemented with 
"orderly marketing agreements." Controversy currently 
exists on the need to impose tariffs on palm oil enter-
ing the U.S. in competition with soybean, cottonseed 
and peanut oil. When sugar prices rose sharply in the 
early 1970's, an intensive system of legislatively man-
dated quotas were removed. 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
Presidents have generally favored flexibility to man-
age import policy in line with what is deemed to be in 
the national interest as is done with other aspects of for-
eign policy and is currently the case under the Export 
Administration Act. 
Export Controls 
Four basic alternatives to present policy exist for con-
trolling exports in a short supply situation: ( 1) remove 
authority for embargoes; (2) congressional power to re-
verse Presidential action; (3) export licensing and (4) 
centralization of exports in the hands of government. 
Specific proposals exist which would give Congress the 
power to reverse a Presidentially imposed embargo with-
in a specific period of time and to have the Commodity 
Credit Corporation act as an exclusive export agency. 
I A move back into surpluses will once again raise a 
spector of concerns about export subsidies, two price f plans, and increased levels of P.L 480 shipments. Such 
~ concerns will be increased if support prices are raised I above world prices. Pressure will once again develop for 
1 
international commodity agreements to establish price 
, floors and/or preferential trade agreements. 
Import Controls 
Import alternatives relate to the level of tariff and 
• placement of responsibility for imposing import con-I non-tariff restrictions for commodities, as well as the 
• trols. Excess supplies and generally low prices by foreign 
JJ nations ha\'e created substantial pressure to increadse ex-
ports for milk, beef and sugar to U.S. Producer an con-
mmers will question the extent to which beef and sugar l quotas should be further limited by law or eliminated. 
l 
CONSEQUENCES 
Generally speaking, lower export and import controls 
represent movements toward free trade. 
Producers are ad,·ersely affected by export controls. 
Controls lower producer prices. In the longer term ex-
port controls jeopardize tlw dependability of the U.S. as 
a source of grain. The unpredictability of export em-
bargoes results in increased uncertainty and price in-
stability. On the other hand, export assistance in the 
form of subsidies on P.L. 480 helps to expand foreign 
markets and raise prices. However, they transfer our sur-
plus problem to the foreign producer. Producers of com-
modities on which import controls exist benefit from 
higher prices. However, U.S. producers in total might be 
hurt in the sense that import controls create incentives 
for other countries to control imports of U.S. products 
where we have a comparative advantage such as grains. 
U.S. producers cannot expect to have free access to for-
eign markets if foreign producers are denied access to 
U.S. markets. 
Agribusiness is most adversely affected by uncertainty 
of government policies with respect to either exports or 
imports. Most firms that deal in exports or imports are 
multinational and therefore deal in the products of all 
countries. While making the U.S. a state trader would 
substantially change the relation of government and the 
major grain exporters, they would still be major factors 
in domestic and international grain trade. Similarly agri-
business has substantial flexibility to adjust to import 
controls but would prefer a free trade situation. 
Foreign Consumers are denied access to our markets 
by export controls. World prices rise relative to U.S. 
prices. Export assistance, on the other hand, increases 
supplies available to foreign consumers and lowers their 
prices. Import controls prevent foreign products from 
moving into U.S. markets and thus tend to benefit for-
eign consumers. 
U.S. consumers benefit from lower food prices re-
sulting from export controls to the extent that lower 
farm prices result in lower retail prices. While producers 
desire no export controls, if food scarcity develops the 
public will likely demand that the impact of food short-
ages be minimized by embargoes, licensing or state trad-
ing. While export assistance in the form of P.L. 480 or 
subsidies increase consumer prices, consumer willingness 
to support P.L. 480 in the face of higher prices results 
from humanitarian considerations. 
Government has substantial power to influence do-
mestic farm and food prices by export and import poli-
cies. Such policies, however, run counter to our basic 
free trade policy. Government costs are increased by ex-
port subsidies and P.L. 480. On the other hand, import 
controls of price supported commodities reduce govern-
ment costs and are in fact, essential to maintaining the 
integrity of these programs if domestic support prices 
are established above world prices. 
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GRAIN RESERVES: ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 
Everett E. Peterson, University of Nebraska 
Barry L. Flinchbaugh, Kansas State Univr rsity 
WHAT IS THE ISSUE? 
The main issue is whether grain reserves shall be held 
by the U.S. goverr.ment for the purposes of meeting 
emergency needs and reducing year-to-year market price 
variations, or whether publicly-held grain reserves will 
continue to be a by-product of supporting certain farm 
commodity prices. From this basic issue, several related 
questions arise. What instabilities come from no, or in-
adequate, reserves and who is affected? Who gains and 
who loses from reserves? How large should reserves be? 
What mix of commodities should be included? What 
price and quantity rules should be established for ac-
quiring and releasing stocks? What will reserves cost and 
who will pay this cost? Is the United States morally ob-
ligated to stockpile food for the world's hungry people? 
WHY IS THIS AN ISSUE? 
The main reasons given for having commodity re-
serves are: 
1. To have adequate supplies for domestic needs from 
one production period to the next; 
2. To reduce price risk and improve efficiency in 
grain production by encouraging long-term investments 
in agricilture; 
3. T .:> provide the basis for more stability in the live-
stock arid poultry industries; 
4. To stabilize food prices to consumers; 
5. To maintain or enlarge exports and encourage 
trade liberalization by being a reliable supply source; 
6. To facilitate food assistance programs for needy 
people at home and in other countries. 
Recent interest in publicly-held grain reserves comes 
from: year-to-year variations in supply since 1972, fear 
of food shortages in poor crop years, export embargoes, 
increasing commercial exports, higher food prices to 
consumers, and sharp fluctuations in grain prices. 
World grain stocks (including rice) averaged 1 70 mil-
lion tons in 1960-72, enough for three month's con-
sumption. By 1975, stocks had declined to 123 million 
tons. With good crops in 1976, stocks are estimated to 
rise to 150 million tons at the beginning of 1977-78 
marketing year. 
From 1950 through 1971, food-deficit countries re~ 
lied upon the U.S. and other major grain exporters tcf 
carry sufficient stocks to stabilize supplies and prices~ 
This confidence was badly shaken by the set of circumf 
stances occurring in 19 7 2-7 5 which depleted grain stock~ 
in the U.S. and world-wide, causing concern over possil 
ble food shortages. 1 
GRAIN RESERVES UNDER THE 1973 ACT 
Provision was made to establish a reserve of invent 
tories not to exceed 7 5 million bushels of wheat, feed 
grains and soybeans to alleviate distress caused by natuj 
ral disaster. Except for this small reserve, the Act con.! 
tinued the price support loan and storage program whicr{ 
has been used since 19 3 8 to provide floors under price~ 
of specified products. Reserves are acquired when farm4 
ers deliver these products to commodity credit corpod 
ation instead of redeeming their loans. CCC stocks car{ 
be released when prices rise above certain levels. i 
Under this non-recourse loan program, governmend 
held stocks tended to accumulate in the l 950's an& 
1960 's as agricultural technology boosted total crori 
production more than enough to offset supply-reducin~ 
effects of land retirement and additional exports uncle~ 
P.L. 480. Once acquired, these surpluses were regarde~1 
as costly and price-depressing. In times of greatly in~ 
creased foreign needs due to war or crop failure, the sud 
pluses are suddenly transformed into "stragetic reserves.{ 
Few farmers participated in the loan-and-storage proi 
gram in 1973, 1974, or 1975 but they are doing so fot 
1976 wheat and feed grain crops. When these loans ma{ 
ture, CCC will again own stocks of grain unless marke~ 
prices rise enough so farmers pay off the loans. , 
FOOD RESERVE POLICY CHOICES 
AND THEIR EFFECTS 
The principal policy choices in regard to reserves are~ 
stocks held by producers and marketing firms with litt14 
government intervention; supplementary govern mend 
held stocks; multi-national reserves held by importin~ 
and exporting nations; international commodity rd 
serves; and some combination of these. H-lf 
Reserves Managed by the Private Sector of the Economy 
Producers and marketing firms own and control re-
serves. They decide how much to store and when to sell 
or buy. In good crop years prices will decline; when 
crops are short prices will rise sharply. 
Development of pri\-ate grain stocks would be con-
sistent with a farm policy of setting prices· in the market. 
Under this alternative the stocks would primarily be 
used for commercial objectives. Producers hold grain 
stocks because they expect the price to rise more than 
enough to cover their storage costs. The grain trade 
would tend to be more concerned with volume and mar-
gin per unit rather than holding stocks for humanitarian 
purposes. Responses to an emergency might be too slow. 
When food is stored, someone pays storage costs. 
These costs will either be passed back to the producer as 
lower prices or forward to the consumer as higher prices. 
U.S. experience in marketing years 1972-73, 1973-74, 
and. 1974-75 demonstrated ~hat can happen to prices 
received by farmers and paid by consumers for food 
when stocks are depleted due to production shortfalls 
and _gr:ater foreign dei:nand. This may lead to export 
restnct10ns and uncertamty among importers as to U.S. 
reliability of a supply source. 
Consequences of private reserve management are: 
(1) Price instability to producers due to variations in 
w~rld suppl~ and demand conditions, but higher average 
pnces over time; 
(2) Higher food prices in years of short crops but lit-
tle, if any, decline in years of abundant supplies due to 
the inflexibility of marketing margins; c 
(3) Possibility of under or over-holding of reserves by 
producers and processors because of inadequate market 
information and lack of organization; and 
( 4) Low government costs for administering, storing 
and maintaining food reserves; storage costs shared by 
producers and consumers. 
Supplementary L.overnment-Held Reserves 
Some people feel that grain stocks carried voluntarily 
by producers and the grain trade will be inadequate and 
that the nation's food policy goals will be more nearly 
achieved by a well-managed public grain reserve program. 
One proposal for managing reserves, in effect, sets 
both upper and lower limits on farm prices. At the lower 
limit, the loan prices, stocks are bought; at the upper 
price limit, stocks are released. A variation of the release 
provisions calls for disposal of a certain percent of 
stocks for each 10 percent increase in price above the 
release activating price. Prices fluctuate between the two 
levels. The general price }e,·el is the market price deter-
mined by quantity of stocks. This procedure may come 
into operation if the 1973 Act is extended but with 
higher target prices and loan rates. 
Another approach establishes a level of reserves which 
the government holds until a policy decision is made 
that an emergency exists, justifying release of stocks. 
Advocates of publicly-held resen-es point to these de-
sired results: (1 \ increased price stability, (2) reduced 
risk, (3) less need to impose export embargoes, and ( 4) 
greater consumer assurance of an adequate and depend-
able supply of grains. Price stability reduces risk in live-
stock production. It makes marketing decisions easier 
for grain farmers. It reduces swings in food prices and 
thus helps reduce inflationary pressures as well as con-
sumer and labor prc:-ssures on government. 
Those who oppose government reserves suggest that 
reserves: (1) distort market signals, (2) depress farm 
prices, ( 3) discourage importing countries from holding 
reserves - placing the full burden of reserves on the 
American taxpayer, (-l) are subject to political manipu-
lation and ( 5) are costly to manage and hold. 
Reserves Held by Importing and Exporting Nations 
Besides establishing a supplementary publicly-held re-
serve, the U.S. government could encourage other coun-
tries to establish their own grain reserves. An additional 
stabilizing influence on world commodity markets could 
result from setting up a world-wide information system 
on crop prospects and national grain stocks. Bilateral or 
multilateral import-export agreements might be consid-
ered as a way to reduce foreign demand uncertainty. So 
long as free trade does not exist and nations maintain 
programs to protect their agriculture, grain reserve poli-
cy is likely to coexist with export restrictions, import 
controls, farm price supports and production controls. 
Consequences of multinational reserves are: 
(1) Greater stability in world commodity prices; 
(2) Adequate supply of food for U.S. consumers; 
(3) Lower cost to American taxpayers than previous 
storage programs; 
( 4) More efficient food production; 
(5) Location of reserves where needed; and 
(6) Possible depressing effect on grain prices. 
Reserves controlled by an international organization 
Acquisition and distribution of emergency grain re-
serves by an international organization has been pro-
posed as a method of preventing mass starvation after 
natural or man-made disasters. Such reserves would not 
be used in situations of chronic malnutrition due to 
overpopulation. International grain reserves could also 
be used for stabilization of commercial markets. 
Either program could be financed by contributions in 
kind from food exporting nations and in cash from 
developed, but food importing, countries. Size of re-
serves, amount of contributions and recipients' eligi-
bility requirements would be established by agreement. 
Probable consequences of internationally controlled 
emergency grain reserves include: 
(1) Ability to respond quickly to alleviate human 
hardships caused by unpredictable calamities; 
(2) Little effect on prices so long as reserves are small 
and not released in commercial channels; 
(3) Possible pressures from poor, hungry nations to 
release reserves for chronic food deficit problems; 
( 4) Possible attempts by food surplus nations to en-
large reserves to prevent low farm product prices; and 
(5) Complex administrative, political and diploma ti.: 
problems peculiar to an international organization. 
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FOOD AID- DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN 
R.G.F. Spitze, University of Illinois 
W. Neill Schaller, Farm Foundation i 
WHAT ARE THE ISSUES? 
In most of the world, food moves to consumers 
through the marketplace. If people and nations can pay 
for it, they will usually be fed. What if they cannot pay 
for it? Food aid, as distinct from technical aid for food 
production, has been one answer in nations rich enough 
to provide it domestically or internationally. At one 
time, almost all food aid was privately administered by 
the family, the church, and other charitable organiza-
tions. Public food aid on a large scale began only in this 
century due to the willingness to have government at-
tend to the needs of people. Surplus disposal and im-
proved foreign relations have also been major objectives. 
Substantial food aid has been provided domestically 
in the U.S. since the 1930's and to fo,reign countries 
since the l 950's. It does not seem a likely policy alter-
native that the public would reverse the path of the past 
and eliminate all food aid. So there are two issues: (1) 
How much public food aid should the U.S. provide and 
to whom? (2) How should food aid be administered? 
WHY ARE THESE ISSUES? 
A combination of developments has raised public con-
cern ab01.;t food aid issues: Short food supplies, infla-
tion, population pressures, and increased awareness of 
malnutrition abroad and at home. In spite of doubts 
about effectiveness of government to administer food 
aid and disappointments in the results of that food aid, 
evidence of continued support is seen in public resolu-
tions and rising appropriations to feed the needy. 
CURRENT FOOD AID PROGRAMS 
Domestic 
Food Stamp Program. Though first operated in 1939-
41, it was reinstated in 1961 and has expanded fourfold 
in the last 5 years. It is administered by the states. The 
amount of aid, in the form of subsidized food coupons 
with cash value, depends on the person ·s income and size 
of family. A little over 1 7 million persons, or 8 percent 
of the U.S. population, currently are recipients, with an 
average aid of $24 per month per person. 
Child Nutrition Programs. These include the School 
' 
Lunch and Special Milk Programs, initiated in the l 
1930's, as well as School Breakfast and Special Food t 
programs (child, summer feeding, and so on) added in t 
the late 1960's. Children receive partially or wholly sub- t 
sidized food at school. The School Lunch program t 
reaches over 25 million children, and the Breakfast pro- 4 
gram over 2.3 million. ' 
Food Distribution. Initiated in 1933, this program J 
authorized the distribution of food purchased by gov- i 
ernment to support the prices of certain farm commodi- f 
ties. Recipients are needy families on American Indian i 
reservations, the schools, and other institutions. t 
Supplemental Food for Women, Infants, and Chit- f 
dren (WIC). This program, started in 1974, provides t 
food aid to pregnant and nursing women and young f 
children whose need for an adequate diet is critical. t 
~ Foreign \ 
In 1954, during a period of falling farm prices and l 
mounting government-held "surpluses," the Agricultural i 
Trade Development and Assistance Act, commonly t 
known as Public Law 480, was passed. It now has two i 
parts: (1) Food donations to countries experiencing dis- f 
aster, and (2) Sale of food on easy credit terms. J 
The current outlay is just over $1 billion, about 803 J 
for concessional sales, and much less in quantity than ' 
previously. Over 80 countries are recipients, with Bangla- J 
desh and India the largest receivers. Only a small frac- ~ 
tion of the hundreds of millions believed to be under- ' 
nourished throughout the world are reached. ~ 
Federal Costs 
In Fiscal Year 1976, the federal cost of our domestic 
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To Producers. These programs could add at the most 
about 4.5 percent to the value of total consumer food 
purchases compared to what they otherwise would be 
without a program. But the effect would more likely be 
about 3 percent due to some substitution of aid for 
commercial purchases. The effect on producer prices 
and incomes would be upward, but most likely less than 
the maxim~m possible of 15 percent, due to the long 
run inducement for greater production. However, pro-
grams involving specific commodities, such as milk and 
meat, would affect those producers relatively more. 
To Agri-business. Food handlers benefit from food 
aid by greater volume according to their function. 
To Foreign Agricultural Trade. A slight downward 
pressure on commercial exports would result, due to 
somewhat higher prices. But total exports could be in-
creased, with a maximum of 5%. Conversely, the added 
, demand would tend to increase imports slightly. 
To Consumers. Although the net benefits to food aid 
recipients are debated, low-income consumers, particu-
larly domestic, would undoubtedly benefit from the 
greater quantity and quality of food at 19wer cost. Over 
1 7 million food stamp recipients and 25 million school 
children are reached. Consumers with higher incomes 
' would face a small increase in food prices, probably 
' from 1 to 3 percent, given the greater production. 
To Taxpayers. With a continuation of programs at 
the present level, but not at the rapid rate of expansion 
of a few years ago, the taxpayer's burden would depend 
on changes in the size of the population, personal in-
come levels, and tax revenues. At present the $9.3 bil-
lion total food aid is less than 3 percent of all federal an-
nual outlays, with a quarter percent foreign aid. 
SUBSTANTIAL FOOD AID 
EXPANSION OR CONTRACTION 
Food Aid Expansion. Substantial food aid expansion 
f could take several forms: reaching more people in tar-
geted groups, increasing the level of cost-sharing for re-
cipients, or inclusion of more groups. A domestic annual 
food aid budget of $10-15 billion, or about 4 percent of 
the total federal budget, would more nearly reach all of 
the 25 million now designated as below the poverty level 
in income, and more of the needy children. A possible 
target for foreign food aid would be to regain the real 
1 relati\·e level of aid of the l 960's and maintain it at a 
stable proportion of the federal budget. This could reach 
$5 billion a year, about 1 percent of the federal budget. 
Food Aid Contraction. Substamial food aid reduc-
;on would inYol\"e a reYer:;al of recent trend5 with a 
,...-er real dollar federal cost, a lower proportion of the 
total budget, and smaller number of recipients, perhaps 
only coverage of emergency assistance. This could re-
sult in a domestic food aid budget of a constant real val-
ue of perhaps $5 billion, about 1.5 percent of the total 
budget and decreasing as budgets grow, and with 5 per-
cent of total population being reached. 
Consequences. Expansion of domestic food aid to 
$10-15 billion and foreign aid to SS billion would likely 
have consequences in the same direction as indicated 
earlier for the present program but with substantially 
greater magnitude. Substantial reduction of food aid be-
low current levels, with domestic being $5 billion an-
nually and foreign donations of $300 million annually, 
would have the opposite effects. 
SUBSTITUTION OF GENERAL CASH PAYMENTS 
FOR FOOD AID - DOMESTIC ONLY 
Domestic food aid could be replaced by a new general 
welfare or income maintenance policy. With sufficient 
public income aid to bring incomes to a minimum !c:""l 
judged adequate for food and other needs, the ""ccipients 
would have a greater choice in their spending, and the 
public would benefit from elimination of administra-
tive duplication, conflict, and complexity. 
But it can also be argued that the nutrition of people, 
particularly the young, can best be served when aid con-
sists of specific foods or food purchases. Food aid has 
been more palatable politically than income payments. 
The effects on food demand, food prices, and product 
prices likely would be less than with food aid. 
CHANGE IN FOOD AID ADMINISTRATION 
Domestic Program Consequences. 
Food aid is administered by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) in cooperation with state and local 
welfare and other governmental agencies. An alternative 
would be administration by another unit as the U.S. De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). 
A possible advantage would be that HEW, the ad-
ministrative home for welfare programs, might have 
greater administrative expertise, offer efficiencies of 
joint overhead, and provide greater budget support. It 
would also remove a possible agriculture bias toward 
using food aid to solve "surplus" farm product problems. 
However, retention of food aid in USDA provides a 
leverage for political support of commercial commodity 
programs and access to existing research about nutri-
tion, food quality, and marketing. 
Foreign Program Consequences. 
Foreign food aid decisions are made substantially by 
the U.S. Department of State, with administration and 
distribution handled by USDA. The issue of any shift is 
the desired balance of goals pursued by these depart-
ments, such as acceptable farm prices vs. foreign rela-
tions. Another alternative appears to be for U.S. for-
eign aid to be administered by an international age:-icy, 
perhaps in conjunction with a world food reserve. Su -h 
a shift removes food aid from domestic and foreign poh 
cy interests but also from L'.S. control. 
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SUBSTANTIAL FOOD AID EXPANSION 
Domestic 
$10-15 billion annually 
Stable 4% of budget 
25 million recipients plus all needy 
children 
Foreign 
$5 billion annually and stable 1% 
of budget 
Some increase in product prices 
Upward income effect 
Upward supply response 
Substantial cost-sharing to low income 
i groups and countries 
! Some increase in domestic market food 
I prices 
Some released purchasing power for nonfood 
items 
I Some reduction in commercial agricultµral 
I exports, but an increase in total 
exports 
Some increase in food im orts 
Higher tax burden 
1 Competition with other public programs 
I 
Slightly higher volume of farm products 
and inputs 
SUBSTANTIAL FOOD AID CONTRACTION 
Domestic 
Stable $5 million annually 
10 million recipients 
Primarily emergency aid 
Foreign 
Limited to donations of $300 monthly 
Incremental depressing effect on farm 
product prices and incomes 
Less cost-sharing to low income groups 
and countries 
Incrementally lower market food prices 
Negligible effect 
Incremental reduction in tax burden or 
release of funds for other purposes 
Negligible effect 
* Prepared by R. G. F. Spitze, University of Illinois, and W. Neill Schaller, Farm Foundation. 
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